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In the folowing, it will be shown that there is no set theoretical formal description of the human society
that incorporates aquite natural and important kind of our inference (recognition) ability. There are many
reasons for which we have to resign ourselves to obtain acomplete economic model. Indeed, the standard
economic theory admits that there are many types of ‘externality’. Moreover, there are many unknown
structures in the real world, especially in technologies, informations, preferences and expectations, etc.
It seems, however, that such problems are treated by economic theorists as merely the gaP between an
idealized economic model and the reality. What Ihave concerned with here is not the gap between them
but the impossibility of the notion of an idealized model itself.
If it is apurpose of economics to describe the human society as atheoretical and well founded
mechanisms of ‘rational’ individuals. An economic model should formalize asystem of rules which make
each agent’s behavior to be called ’rational’. In order to formalize such economic Nationality’, however,
we should premise arestricted view on individual prospects or thoughts about the whole world. If it were
not, as we shall see in this paper, the view of the world necessarily be inconsistent (hence, every action
would be rational for him). On the other hand, with such arestricted view of the world, agents are not
allowed to ask whether the world is exactly like what they are thinking about (in their view of the model).
In other words, aconsistent view (description) of the world should be incomplete in the sense that every
agents should convinced in the rightness of the view itself without any proofs.
The reader may consider that the result in this paper is related to $\mathrm{G}\dot{\mathrm{o}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1’\mathrm{s}$ second incompleteness
theorem. Indeed, the main theorem in this paper may be considered as ageneralized version of Tarski’s
truth definition theorem which is known as another important result of G\"odel’s lemma for the incomplete-
ness theorem.l It should be noted, however, that there is an important difference between the foundation
of mathematics and the foundation of our view on the society including ourselves. The former is the
problem on what mathematics can do to formalize our rationality, and the latter is an argument of for-
malizing our rationality itself. We may change and reconstruct mathematics through our conviction and
beliefs. In order to formalize ourselves, however, any restricted formalization may fail to characterize our
total recognition abiity; whereas there isn’t any simple way or regular routine to formalize our general
intelligence.
In this PaPer, the rationality is treated as an attitude to accept aformal assertion that is written in
acertain formal $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}.2$ The syntax for such alanguage and semantics (especially for the meanings of
the rationality) are given by acertain theory of sets $g$ $=(L_{B}, R_{B},T_{B})$ which we call an underlying theory
of $sets^{3}$. We assume that each person $i$ using $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ formal language has atheory $=$ ($L:$ , R., $T$ )
which is at least as strong as the underlying theory of sets, $\mathit{9}^{4}$. Thus, we are modeling the situation
that person $i$ is possible to treat $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ assertion $\theta$ in the language of $i$ (theory $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ ) as aset theoretic
object $\ulcorner\theta^{\urcorner}$ through the basic underlying theory J. The problem we treat in this paper is that whether
we may construct aformula $P_{}(x)$ of person :in one free variable $x$ such that $P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})$ means that 0is a
rationally acceptable assertion of :. Of course the answer depends on properties that we request for the
meanings of the ‘rational acceptability’. What we have concerned with here are the logical consistency
1 Mathematical concepts in this paper may be found in the standard literature in mathematical logic
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ theory of sets, e.g., see Kunen (1980), Jech (1997), Fraenkel, Bar-Hillei, and Levy (1973).
2 Throughout this paper, we use such alinguistic definitions and approaches that may be common
in standard arguments in the philosophical analysis. On the standpoint of our notions of rationality and
truth, however, Idepend much on the work of H. Putnum (1983).
3 Aprecise definition will be given in section 2.
4 Of course there must be an appropriate translation between $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ formal language and the language
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( $P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})$ and $P(^{\ulcorner}\neg\theta^{\urcorner})$ never occurs simultaneously) and the introspective completeness ( $P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})$ means
$P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}Pj(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner}))$ . The main theorem in this paper shows that there is no $P_{i}$ satisfying both of these two
important properties (Theorem 3). Theorems in this paper shows:
(1) The description of the world with the notion $P_{i}$ cannot be acomplete one as long as we need $P_{i}$
to be consistent.
(2) Especially, we cannot intrespectively recognize the consistency and the completeness (of our
world view) itself.
(3) We cannot define (completely describe) what the rationality is as long as we require it to be
consistent.
Therefore, all rational economic agent in astandard economic model, should believe in $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ ra-
tional choices without knowing what the rationality is. Every players in anon-cooperative game theory,
should believe in $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ and other players’ rational behaviors without knowing what the rationality ex-
actly means. This seems to be afailure in all mathematical models of the social science based on the
methodological individualism. Indeed, the concept of ’rational individual’ (consistency) always prevent us
from having asatisfactory answer to the question ‘How the society is’ (introspection) (see, Theorem 2, (b)
and (c) $)$ . Of course this is not saying that all attempts in describing the society as the whole of rational
individuals are meaningless. The result suggests, however, that such attempts never be completed even in
an asymptotic sense and that we have to allow for the relation between our recognition abilities and views
of the world.
2. THE WORLD VIEW
The difference between the approach in this paper and the ordinary economic model is that we request
for an economic agent in the model to have areasonable account for $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ economic behaviors. Let
$I=\{1, 2, \ldots, m\}$ be the index set of agents. For each $i\in I$ , denote by $A_{:}$ the set of possible economic
actions for agent $i$ . Each action profile ( $a_{1}$ , a2, $\ldots$ , $a_{m}$ ) $\in\prod_{:\in I}A_{i}$ in the economy decides an economic
consequence $\mathrm{c}_{i}$ in aset $C_{\dot{1}}$ for each $\mathrm{i}\in I$ .
Astandard microeconomic theory and non-cooperative game theory start from such an individual
decision making problem. In most economic models, there are stories or mathematical structures, e.g.,
equilibrium and solution concepts, that enable for each agent $i$ to have asufficient reason for $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$
choices of an action $a_{i}$ . As there are many reasons for (mutually exclusive) many actions to be chosen,
there may also be many equilibrium and solution concepts. The rationality (the reason) in this sense
crucially depends on the view of the world (the equilibrium concept). The purpose of this paper is to show
that this type of rationality is completely different from our true rationality (thinking) and that the use
(merely apart) of our true rationality may lead us to deny any such aspecific view of the world and the
rationality in the restricted sense.
In this paper, we suppose that agent $i$ has atheory (written by aformal language) $\mathscr{L}_{i}=(L:, R_{i},T_{\dot{*}})$
for obtaining areason to decide an action $a_{i}$ . $L_{j}$ is the list of all symbols for the language, $R_{\dot{4}}$ is the list
of all syntactical rules including construction rules for terms, formulas, and all inference rules (making a
consequent formula from original formulas, e.g., modus ponens, instantiation, etc.), and 1is the list of
all axiomatic formulas for the theory. We assume that each element of $L_{i}$ may be uniquely identified with
(coded into) an object in acertain basic theory of sets, $\mathscr{B}=(L_{B}, R_{B}, T_{B})$ , which we call an underlying
theory of sets for $\mathscr{L}_{\dot{1}}.\mathrm{s}$
$\mathrm{s}$ Practically, the reader may identify $\mathscr{B}$ with Zermelo Fraenkel set theory under the first order predicate
logic. Since such acoding argument is usually restricted in the domain of finitistic objects, aminima
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The first important assumption of this paper is that such aset theory is so basic that every agent
could develop (understand) it by their own language.
(A.I) The theory $4=$ ( $L_{:}$ , R., $T$ ) is at least as strong as $g$ $=(L_{B}, R_{B},T_{B}).6$ (Here, we implicitly
assume that there is an appropriate translation between the languages for 4and 9. Throughout
this paper, such atranslation is assumed to be fixed, and we suppose that each formula $\varphi$ in $g$
could be identified with “the same” formula in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ without loss of generality.)
The second assumption in this paper is that though the theory, $4=$ $(L:, R\{, T_{i})$ , of: may be stronger
than $g$ $=$ $(L_{B}, R_{B}, T_{B})$ , the structure of theory 4, i.e., each rules in list Ri is written in the language of
the underlying theory of sets, $g$. More precisely;
(A.2) $g$ describes $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{\dot{1}}$ in the following sense: (i) Each member of list $L$:is aset in theory 91. (ii)
List $R_{\dot{4}}$ consists of formulas in theory 9. Especially, there are two formulas in one free variable,
TePi(x) and Form:(x), describing, respectively, the construction rules for terms and formulas
of $i$ . Every inference rule, as arelation among formulas of $i$ , is also written in the language of
91. (ii) Axioms(x) which defines formulas of $|$. belonging to list 1is aformula in $g$.
Note that, under assumption (A.2), acombination of inference procedures, such as aproof procedure in
theory $\mathscr{L}_{i}$ , may be identified with aset theoretic procedure written in the form of aformula in theory 9.
It should also be noted that each term, formula, and inference procedure (including the proof procedure)
of $i$ may not be finitistic (recursive) since the set theoretic methods in $g$ may be much stronger than the
finitistic method.
Under (A.I) and (A.2), an agent $i$ is possible to treat an assertion (formula) 0in the language of :
(theory $\mathscr{L}$ ) as aset theoretic object $\ulcorner\theta^{\urcorner}$ through the underlying theory of sets, $\mathit{9}^{7}$. In the following, we
call the theory, $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ $=(L:, R_{i},T_{i})$ , satisfying these two assumptions, (A.I) and (A.2), the world view of $i$ .
The world view may include many features of the real world by adding additional axioms and syntactical
rules, if necessary, and we suppose that an agent $i$ chooses a‘rational’ action $a:\in A$:under the world
view, 4. The third assumption is on the possibility of such astructure in the world view deciding the
‘rationality’.
(A.3) There is aformula, $P_{}(x)$ , in one free variable, $x$ , in the theory of $i$ to mean that $x$ $=\theta^{\urcorner}\ulcorner$ for
acertain formula $\theta$ of :and $\theta$ is rationally acceptable for $i$ . The meaning of $P_{}(x)$ as away to
decide such sentences is also given as aset theoretic property under the set theory $g$ , (hence, we
may not require it to be finitistic), so that $P_{}(x)$ may also be identified with aformula in $g$.
Under (A.2), one of the most typical set theoretic procedure in 9satisfying conditions in (A.3) for $P_{}(x)$
(the rational acceptability) may be the proof procedure in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , though we do not confine ourselves to this
most familier case. In ordinary settings in economics, such a $P$ may be considered as an arbitrary formula
allowing, at least, one assertion specifying acertain character of $a_{\dot{1}}$ $\in A_{\dot{1}}$ as apossible final decision of an
agent $i$ , as rationally acceptable. For example, such assertions may be: “final decision $a_{i}\in A_{i}$ of $i$ is a
price taking and utility maximizing behavior,” for an ordinary micro economics settings, “final decision
$a:\in A_{:}$ of $i$ is abest response given other agents’ behaviors,” for Nash equilibrium settings, and so on. It
follows that, an agent $i\in I$ chooses an action $a_{i}\in A_{\dot{1}}$ only if there is asentence of $i$ , $\theta$ , which is $\mathrm{r}\dot{\mathrm{a}}$tionally
acceptable, $(P(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner}))$ , asserting that agent :is allowed to chose action $a$:as $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ final decision.
underlying set theory may be $ZF^{-}-P$ -INF, $ZF$ with the axiom of foundation, the power set, and the
infinity are deleted.
6 That is, every theorem in 9is atheorem in 4.
7 For finitistic objects, the notation $\ulcorner\urcorner$ is called Quine’s corner convention
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3. THE RATIONALITY
As stated in the introduction, we are considering that an economic model should incorporate astructure
which makes each agent’s behavior to be called rational. In the previous section, such astructure is
represented by the formula, $P_{\dot{1}}(x)$ , for agent $i$ under the world view, $\mathscr{L}_{\dot{*}}=$ ( $L_{:}$ , R., $T\dot{.}$ ), of $i$ . We shall make
in this section afurther specification on the property $P_{i}(x)$ , the rationality of $i$ .
Perhaps, the most important property for $P_{i}$ to be called as the rationality of $i$ will be the consistency.
It seems, however, that there are two kind of such consistency. One is the logical consistency and the other
is the semantical consistency. We say that $P_{i}(x)$ is logically consistent if for any sentence 0of $i$ , $P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})$
and $P_{i}(^{\ulcorner_{\urcorner}}\theta^{\urcorner})$ do not hold simultaneously. The logical consistency of $P_{i}(x)$ as afact in the underlying
theory of sets, 7is denoted by $CONS(P_{i})$ . Formally;
(D.I) $CONS(P_{i})$ is aformula in $\mathscr{B}$ which is equivalent to saying that $Form_{\dot{1}}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})arrow(P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})arrow$
$\neg P_{j}(^{\ulcorner}\neg\theta^{\urcorner})).\epsilon$
The semantical consistency of $P_{\dot{*}}$ is the requirement that for any sentence $\theta$ of $i$ , $P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})$ and
$\neg P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}P_{\dot{1}}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})\urcorner)$ do not hold simultaneously. Since the condition (ordinarily) means that for each sen-
Since 0of $i$ , $P_{*}.(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})arrow P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$ , we also call it the introspective completeness and denote it (as a
fact in the underlying theory of sets) by $COMP(P_{i})$ . Formally;
(D.2) COMP(P;) is aformula in 7which is equivalent to saying that $Form:(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})arrow(P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})arrow$
$P_{}(^{\ulcorner}P_{\dot{\iota}}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner}))$ .
The logical consistency and the introspective completeness of $P_{i}$ will be argued in the next section
as mostly desirable properties for $P_{i}$ . The reminder of this section is devoted to define additional basic
properties for $P_{i}$ . In the following, we assume that $P_{\dot{*}}$ automatically satisfies all of the following four
$\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}.9$
(A.4) If $\mathscr{B}\vdash\theta$ , then $\mathscr{B}\vdash P_{i}(^{\Gamma}\theta^{\urcorner})$ .
That is, each theorem in the underlying theory of sets is rationally acceptable for $i$ .
(A.5) If B\vdash Form\^i) $(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})\wedge Form_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\eta^{\urcorner})\wedge^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner}=\eta\ulcorner\urcorner$ , then $\mathscr{B}\vdash P_{\dot{*}}(^{\ulcorner}\thetarightarrow\eta^{\urcorner})$ .
This implies that for each two formulas of $i$ which are proved to be equal as set theoretical objects in 9,
it is rationally acceptable to treat them as equivalent formulas.
(A.6) $\mathscr{B}$ $\vdash Formj(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})arrow(P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})\urcorner)arrow P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner}))$ .
The rational acceptability of $\theta$ under the rational acceptability of $P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})$ is quite natural.
(A.7) ? $(Form_{*}.(\theta)\wedge Former’))$ $arrow(P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\thetaarrow\eta^{\urcorner})arrow(P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})arrow P_{\dot{1}}(^{\ulcorner}\eta^{\urcorner})))$ .
If $\thetaarrow\eta$ and $\theta$ are rationally acceptable, then $\eta$ is rationally acceptable. That is, the assumption means
that rationally acceptable statements are closed under the modus ponens.
8 Here, we implicitly assume that for each formula 0in $\mathscr{L}_{i}$ , $\neg\theta$ is also aformula in $\mathscr{L}_{i}$ , and that the
translation process between $\ulcorner\theta^{\urcorner}$ and $\ulcorner_{\neg\theta^{\urcorner}}$ may be written in aformula in $\mathscr{B}$ . Note also that as stated in
(A.3), $P(x)$ i$\mathrm{s}$ considered as aformula in $\mathscr{B}$ .
9 The following assumptions are written in the form of theorems (or ametatheorems on theorems) in
$\mathscr{B}$ . The symbol $\vdash \mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ that the right hand side is atheorem under the development of the theory that
may uniquely be identified with the expression at the left hand side. Since proofs in $\mathscr{L}_{i}$ (hence, in 9,)
may be considered as objects in the underlying theory of sets, an expression such as $” \mathscr{L}_{i}\vdash\theta’$’may also
be considered as aformula in the underlying set theory
267
4. THE INCOMPLETENESS
In this section, the main result of this paper is given in the form of three theorems. These are different
aspects of the same fact (a certain kind of incompleteness of Pi) under $g$ with several auxiliary assump-
tions. The first theorem says that with additional properties in $(\mathrm{A}.1)-(\mathrm{A}.7)$ , CONS(P;) $\wedge COMP(P_{i})$ is
false or is not rationally acceptable.
THEOREM 1. Under (A.1)$-(\mathrm{A}.7),10$
$g$ $\vdash(CONS(P_{i})\wedge COMP(P\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}))arrow\neg P$ ( $CONS(P)$ A $COMP(P_{i})^{\urcorner}$),
Proof. Let 0be aformula in one free variable in $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , $q(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})$ be the formula $P(^{\ulcorner}\neg\theta(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$ , and $Q$
be the formula $q(^{\ulcorner}q^{\urcorner})$ . Note that by (A.3), $q$ , Pi, and $Q$ may be considered as formulas in $g$ as well as $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{i}$
though 0may not be. Moreover, for $q$ to be well defined as aformula in $g$, we assume (under condition
(A.2) $)$ that the procedure $\ulcorner\theta^{\urcorner}\mapsto\ulcorner_{\neg\theta(^{\ulcorner}\theta^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner}}$ may be written by the formula in $g$. Then,
$g$ $\vdash^{\ulcorner}Q^{\urcorner}=P_{}\ulcorner(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner}$. (1)
Since $g$ $\vdash$ (COMP(P$\cdot)\wedge P(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\urcorner})$ ) $arrow P(^{\ulcorner}P(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$ , by equation (1) together with (A.5) and (A.7),
we have
$g$ $\vdash$ ($COMP(P_{})$ A $P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\urcorner})$) $arrow P_{}(^{\ulcorner}Q^{\urcorner})$ . (2)
Therefore,
$g$ $\vdash$ (CONS(P${ }$ ) A COMP(P )) $arrow\neg P(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\gamma})$ . (3)
Then, by (A.4) and (A.7),
$g$ $\vdash P_{}$ ( $CONS(P)$ A $COMP(P)^{\urcorner}$) $arrow P(^{\ulcorner}\neg P(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$ . (4)
As (1), it is also clear that $g$ $\vdash\ulcorner_{\neg Q^{\urcorner\ulcorner}}=\neg P(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner}$. Then, by substituting it into (4),
$g$ $\vdash P_{}(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P)\wedge COMP(P)^{\urcorner})arrow P(^{\ulcorner}\neg Q^{\urcorner})$. (5)
Hence, by (3) and (5), we have
g $\vdash$ (CONS(P.) A COMP(P4)) $arrow\neg P(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P)\wedge COMP(P)^{\urcorner})$ , (6)
which was to be proved. $\blacksquare$
The next theorem consists of assertions with one more additional property, CONS(Pj) or COMP(P;),
to (A.5)-(A.7). The theorem shows how these two concepts are mutually introspectively inconsistent.
THEOREM 2. Assume that (A.1)-(A.7) hold.
(a) If COMP(Pi), then $g$ $\vdash CONS(P\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT})$ $arrow\neg P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P)^{\urcorner})$ .
(b) If CONS(P:), then $g$ $\vdash COMP(P;)arrow\neg P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}COMP(P)^{\urcorner})$ .
(c) If $CONS(P_{\dot{1}})$ , then $g$ $\vdash\neg COMP(P_{i})\wedge P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\neg COMP(P)^{\urcorner})\wedge\neg P_{}(^{\ulcorner}COMP(P_{})^{\urcorner})$ .
(d) If COMP(P;), then $g$ $\vdash\neg CONS(P)$ A $P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\neg CONS(P_{})^{\urcorner})$ .
10 More precisely, we are supposing that every facts in (A.1)-(A.7) may be treated as trivial theorems
by definitions in the underlying theory of sets, $g$.
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PROOF. (a) and (b) may easily be obtained by deleting $COMP(P_{i})$ (resp., CONS(Fj)) from (2) -
(6) in the proof of Theorem 1. By (b), (A.4), and (A.7), we have
$\mathscr{B}\vdash P_{}(^{\ulcorner}COMP(P_{\dot{*}})^{\urcorner})arrow P.\cdot(^{\ulcorner}\neg P_{\dot{1}}(COMP(P_{\dot{l}}))^{\urcorner})$ . (7)
Moreover, by CONS(P:), we also have
$\mathscr{B}\vdash P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\neg P_{i}(COMP(P_{\dot{*}}))^{\urcorner})arrow\neg P_{}(^{\ulcorner}P_{\dot{1}}(^{\ulcorner}COMP(P_{i})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$. (8)
By (7) and (8), we have $\mathscr{B}\vdash P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}C\mathrm{O}MP(P_{i})^{\urcorner})arrow\neg P_{j}(^{\ulcorner}P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}COMP(P_{i})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$ , so that $g$ $\vdash$ COMP(Pi)
By using (A.4) and CONS(Pi) repeatedly, we obtain (c). Lastly, by applying ‘(A.4) and (A.7)’ twice on
(a), we have
$\mathscr{B}\vdash P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P_{})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})arrow P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\neg P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P_{})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$. (9)
On the other hand, we have by (A.6)
$P(^{\ulcorner}P_{}(^{\ulcorner}\neg P_{}(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P_{})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})arrow P.\cdot(^{\ulcorner}\neg P.\cdot(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P_{\dot{*}})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$ . (10)
Therefore, by (9) and (10), we have $\mathscr{B}$ $\vdash P_{\dot{*}}(^{\ulcorner}P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P_{i})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})arrow P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}\neg P_{i}(^{\ulcorner}CONS(P_{i})^{\urcorner})^{\urcorner})$ so that
$\mathscr{B}$ $\vdash\neg CONS(Pj)$ . Then, by (A.4), we have (d). $\blacksquare$
The last theorem is on the inconsistency of all properties (A.1)-(A.7), CONS(P;), and $COMP(P_{i})$ ,
together with the underlying theory of sets, $\mathscr{B}$ . It may also possible to understand the theorem as an
undefinability theorem of the concept “rationality”.
THEOREM 3. Under (A.1)-(A.7), CONS(P$\cdot$ ), and $COMP(P_{i})$ , the theory $g$ is contradictory.
Proof. In this case, $\mathscr{B}$ proves COMS(P;) $\wedge$ COMP(P;) and Pi(rCOMS(Pi) $\wedge C\mathrm{O}MP(P \mathrm{i})$ as
well as Theorem 1. Hence, acontradiction follows. $\blacksquare$
If we change (A.3) to assure the property of $P$ in (A.3) without maintaining the existence of $P_{*}.$ ,
the above theorem asserts that there is no possibility for defining aconcept of the rationality satisfying
$(\mathrm{A}.4)-(\mathrm{A}.7)$ , $CONS(P_{})$ and $COMP(P_{*}.)$ , i.e., we obtain an undefinability theorem of rationality. The
special case that $\mathscr{B}=\mathscr{L}_{}=ZF$ and $P_{i}$ is considered as adefinition of “truth” (which clearly satisfies
$(\mathrm{A}.4)-(\mathrm{A}.7)$ , $CONS(P_{i})$ and COMP(Pi) $)$ is Tarski’s truth definition theorem (see, Kunen (1980), p.41).
(Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Japan)
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